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1. Land reform: definition and motivation 
 Land reform is an ancestral political economic instrument that has been used 
by governments and political agents in different ways. In this section we try to define 
our notion of land reform. The literature, especially in economics, regarding this issue 
is vast. So we must narrow our aim at defining this object of study. 
My definition of land reform includes only land redistribution from large 
estates (latifundia) to smaller ones (minifundia). Thus, we exclude the reverse action of 
gathering minifundia into a larger latifundia. 
 Branco and Rocha de Sousa (2006) have established a typology of land 
reforms, using a matrix between the economic component and the political 
component. Below we present this definition on Table 1. For the economic 
component we tried to evaluate if a land reform was well succeeded, so that (total 
factor) productivity of the land increased. For the political assessment we tried to 
distinguish between revolutionary land reforms, structural change, accompanied by a 
coup d’état or revolution; and reformist land reforms, so that there is not a sudden 
change but a gradual and swift sustained change in government (Zakarya, 2004). 
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Table 1: Actual Land Reforms 
Economic System 
VERSUS 
Political System 
 
 
CENTRALIZED (C) 
[+ STATE] 
 
 
DECENTRALIZED (D) 
[+ MARKET] 
 
 
REFORMIST (R) 
WITHOUT SUDDEN 
POLITICAL CHANGE 
(WITHOUT 
REVOLUTION OR 
COUP) 
(C,R) 
BRAZIL (MST 2000); 
VIETNAM (1988)  
 
MOZAMBIQUE (2004-5) 
 
(D,R) 
BRAZIL (CÉDULA 2000) 
JAPAN (1945);  
THAILAND (90’S) 
GUATEMALA (1952-1954) -
Arbenz Regime 
CHINA (1978-present) 
  
STRUCTURAL (S) 
WITH SUDDEN 
POLITICAL CHANGE 
(WITH REVOLUTION 
OR COUP) 
(C,S) 
PORTUGAL (1975) 
GUATEMALA (1954-1990)- 
military junta 
ZIMBABWE (1990-2005) 
(D,S) 
Eastern Europe countries after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, 
e.g.. UCRAINE (1991)  
Source: Branco and Rocha de Sousa (2006) 
 Additionally, Kawagoe (1999) also has established his political economic 
typology of land reforms. 
Table 2: Feasible Land Reforms 
 Ex-Post Land Reform 
 Market Economy (M) Socialist 
 Peasant Commercial (S) 
  (p) ( c )   
  Market Asian Model  Socialist Model 
Ex Economy (1.1.) (1.2.) (1.4.) 
Ante Peasant (p) Mp-->Mp Mp--> Mc Mp-->S 
    Latin American Model   
Land Half-feudal (3.1.) (3.2.) (3.4.) 
  (F) F--> Mp F--> Mc F-->S 
    Transition Eco. Model    
Reform Socialist (4.1.) (4.2.)   
  (S) S--> Mp S--> Mc   
 Source: Kawagoe (1999: 44) based on De Janvry (1981a,b) [also Rocha de Sousa (2006: 70)] 
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2. Land reform and peasant movements in Latin America 
“Amor é latifúndio, sexo é invasão.”4  
MPB’s, singer Rita Lee 
 
 In this paper we focus our analysis on Latin American land reforms5,6. Dorner 
(1991) and De Janvry (1981 a,b) have studied this issue at length. There are also 
several studies of peasant movements in Latin America, namely for MST – Movimento 
dos Sem Terra (Landless Workers) in Brazil (Masselli, 1998; Fernandes, 1999; Ricci, 
1999). Forman (1974) presented the evolution of campesinos, and how the structure of 
the land defined power relations among different agents, also in Brazil. Wright and 
Wolford (2003) present an updated version of MST’s formation. Lapp (2004) 
scrutinizes voting power of campesinos for all Latin America. 
 
Source: Data adapted from Deininger and Olinto (1999: 23) 
                                                 
4 Freely translated as: “Love is large estate, sex is invasion.” Brazilian popular singer, Rita Lee. 
5 There are a lot of studies of land reform in Africa, for the general case (Juul and Lund, 2002; Lund, 
2002; Peters; 2002; Manji, 2006), Ethiopia (Benin and Pender, 2001; Taddese; 2001), Ghana (Berry, 
2002), Mozambique (Unruh, 1998; Virtannen; 2004), Nigeria (Omotayo, 2003), Kenya (McPeak, 
2005), Sahel (Grigsby, 2002; Thébaud, 2002), Senegal (Juul, 2002), South Africa (Williams et al., 
1996; Zyl et al., 2001; Cousins, 2002), Tanzania (Wanitzek and Sippel, 1998) and Zimbabwe (Moyo, 
2001; Hammar, 2002; Addison and Laakso, 2003). 
6 For Asia there are the following studies: Bangladesh (Devine, 2002), Phillipines (Borras, 2003), Japan 
(Dore, 1959; Hayami et al., 1991; Kawagoe, 1999), India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2002), Mongolia 
(Neupert, 1999; Fernandez-Gimenez, 2002), Thailand (Byamugisha ,1999a, 1999b) and Vietnam 
(Ravallion and Van de Valle, 2001, 2003). 
Figure 1: Land Gini Index Comparison (1966-90)
0,56
0,81
0,67
0,64
0,56
0,61
0,57
0,65
0 
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
Land Gini 
East Asia  & Pacific
Latin America 
Mid. East & N. Africa
North America
South Asia 
Sub-Saharian.
Western Europe 
Total 
i r  :  i i I  ri  ( - )
,
,
,  
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
,
 i i
t i    ifi
ti  ri
i . t  . fri
t  ri
t  si
- ri .
t r  r
t l
 5
 Figure 1 presents the grassroots for all the land political movements, and we 
can observe that in Latin America, the Gini for land inequality had, for the period 
1966-90, the highest average of all continents, respectively 81% (of a maximum 
allowed of 100%). Thus, we can state that inequality in land distribution, which is 
particularly striking in Latin America, caused discontent and thus political struggle for 
these lands. 
  The crucial nexus of the landed power is that land occupation, later could 
yield a legal title for that land, if it would be legally recognised by the government. In 
Brazil we have clearly two types of land reform: i) occupation and invasion of lands by 
the MST (the dominant one), and ii) a market led land reform (land bill land reform, 
called “Cédula da Terra”) in which the landless might buy land from a farmers’ 
association, with bonus interest, with a waiting period7 of two years, and in which 
they choose the best land for their aims, and have access to technical support by 
qualified agronomists – see Buainain et al. (1998; 1999a,b; 2002, 2003). 
 More than defend itself one mode or the other we must perceive that reality is 
sufficiently enough complex in order to comply both systems. 
 Nevertheless, at the political economic level, the struggle of the farmers for 
better conditions has been for a long time in the economic literature (e.g. Kautsky 
(1898) in general, and for Portugal, Cunhal (1976), presented an updated version of 
Kautsky’s work.). 
 Binswanger et al. (1995) analyses the political landed elite relations and has 
become a classical corner-stone of this literature. Huizer’s (2001) work presents 
several recent political rooted campesinos movements. 
 For the case of Mexico, Bobrow-Strain (2007) presents the formation of 
Chiapas struggle, in which ladinos (indigenous who do not follow ancestral traditions) 
fight against traditional farmers. Additionally, Collier and Quaratiello (1999) abridge 
the same subject. 
 What kind of conclusion can we withdraw from all these studies?  
 The first point is that violence against the landed elite pays off for the offender, 
sooner or later, they will get a title for land that they eventually can negotiate and 
enter again in the political struggle for new lands. Of course, there is some risk in this 
struggle, some landless workers can eventually get killed or severally injured in the 
                                                 
7 Or grace period, as is also usually referred in the financial literature, which means that the loan starts 
to be repaid only after this time has elapsed. 
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process. Buainain (2003) refers using CPT’s (Comissão Pastoral da Terra) data that in 
2002, for Brazil, there were 743 land conflicts, of which 43 deaths, 425 780 people 
involved, and 3 million ha of land involved. Figure 2, illustrates recent MST workers 
land’s occupation in Brazil for 2002 [Fernandes based on CPT, 2003]. 
 The second point, which led me further to study the subject, is: What are the 
aggregate gains or losses of land reform? 
 Do the gains of some outreach the losses of others, in a sense that we can talk about a net 
welfare gain? 
 I addressed this issue of analysing the aggregate effect of land reform on 
growth, as defined on the first section (a redistribution of large estate to smaller 
productive estates) using Arrow’s learning by doing (LBD) growth model. The novelty 
of this approach is the use of human capital in the assessment of land reform.  
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Figure 2: Land occupations in Brazil by number of families (2002) 
Source: CPT- Comissão Pastoral da Terra (2003) 
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3. Human capital land reform assessment 
 
We use Arrow’s (1962) economic growth model with “learning by doing” (LBD) to 
evaluate and assess the aggregate loss of welfare due to land reform. Besides, we use 
Arrow’s model adapted with human capital. 
 
Main Hypothesis:  During traditional land reform all the human capital is destroyed 
since we have the substitution of experienced managers (agronomists) by farmers 
(campesinos) with few or at all no experience. 
 
This hypothesis will be further enlarged to partial human capital loss. 
 
Main Question: How many years does it take to recover human capital loss due to land reform? 
 
We have the stream of future profits (S) with human capital: 
 [ ] ( ). .
0
. ( ) . 1 . .
T
t tS e H t W e dtρ θγ−= −∫  
In which ρ is the inter-temporal discount rate (or the interest rate or opportunity cost 
of project’s evaluation), [ ]( )H tγ is a production function which results from human 
capital investment till moment t, and 1 . tW eθ− r represents unitary profit derived from 
a wage cost W, with θ  denoting wage growth rate. 
So we must now compare two profits streams: the discounted agronomist’s profit 
flow since the beginning till the time of land reform (SAGN), with the profits 
campesinos flow since the time of land reform till a period in which all the human 
capital is recovered (T**), and we name it (STB): 
 
[ ] ( ). .
0
. ( ) . 1 . .
RAT
t t
AGNS e H t W e dt
ρ θγ−= −∫  
 
[ ] ( )** . .. ( ) . 1 . .
RA
T
t t
TB RA
T
S e H t T W e dtρ θγ−= − −∫  
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Hypothesis 2: we assume that the interest rate ρ is the same (i.e. is not affected by 
land reform), that wage growth rate, θ , is the same and that the production 
[ ]( )H tγ and the profit rate is also the same: 1 . tW eθ− . 
Do notice that these hypotheses can be changed without major changes in the quality 
of the model’s results. 
Dynamic Recovery Threshold of Traditional Land Reform (DRTTLR) 
In this analysis we aim to compare SAGN and STB to obtain T**. This is the time value 
from which after a land reform all human capital is totally recovered by the 
farmers/campesinos. 
The following condition allows us to formalize DRTTLR: 
 TB AGNS S≥  
Thus, replacing by the respective function discounted cash-flows values: 
 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( )** . . . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . . . ( ) . 1 . .
RA
RA
TT
t t t t
TB RA AGN
T
S e H t T W e dt e H t W e dt Sρ θ ρ θγ γ− −= − − ≥ − =∫ ∫  
Like all variables and integrand functions (given all our resctritive initial hypotheses) 
are the same, the DRTTLR analysis is based upon the integration limits: 
 
**
0
(´ ). (´ ).
RA
RA
TT
RA
T
Z t T dt Z t dt− ≥∫ ∫  
Thus, solving for the gain function(Z(t)): 
 **( ) ( ) ( ) (0)RA RA RA RAZ T T Z T T Z T Z− − − ≥ −  
Which will be equivalent, since ( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z− =  can be eliminated by being 
common to both members, and if Z(t) monotonous increasing8: 
**( ) ( )RA RAZ T T Z T− ≥  
**( ) 2. ( )RAZ T Z T≥  
From here we can derive that the dynamic profitability comes defined by the implict 
function. By the injectivity of the gain function (Z(.)) we can state that the gains on 
the threshold T** have to exceed at least the double of accumulated gains till land 
reform. 
                                                 
8 The initial hypothesis I used was the separability of the function, but this one is too restrictive. It is 
enough to state that the function is increasingly monotonous to withdraw the conclusion in the text. 
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Figure 3 presents the Possibility Set of Land Reform (PSLR), accordingly to the 
condition of recovery of human capital loss in the space of possible gains (Z(T**) vs 
Z(TRA)). 
Figure 3 – Possibility Sets of Land Reform on ARROW’s model (1962)  
 
 
For a simple case in which the gain function is linear (thus T**=2TRA), it is the inferior 
line which defines the Possibility Set of land Reform (PSLR)– see next figure. 
Figure 4 – Possibility Sets of Land Reform with linear gain in ARROW (1962) 
 
 
Some interesting questions might arise in this model in which we proceed to land 
reform (even without formal land variable). Let us change the wage growth. 
 
 
 
 
T1 TRA 
T2=2.T1 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
T2 
FLR T** 
Z(T1) Z(TRA) 
Z(T2)=2.Z(T1) 
Bissectrix 
PSLR 
Z(T2) 
FLR Z(T**) 
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Hypothesis 3 
If the growth wage rate increases due to a process of land reform, what happens to 
the dynamic recovery threshold of land reform (DRTTLR)? 
 
Let’s analyze the cash-flow condition of an ex-post wage rate increase after the land 
reform, i.e. with 2 1θ θ> , we will have the following condition: 
[ ] ( ) [ ] ( )2 1** . .. .2 1
0
(.; ) . ( ) . 1 . . . ( ) . 1 . . (.; )
RA
RA
TT
t tt t
TB RA AGN
T
S e H t T W e dt e H t W e dt Sθ θρ ρθ γ γ θ− −= − − ≥ − =∫ ∫
 
This condition will be the one which will allow in this context that land reform 
recovered all the lost human capital. 
 
4. Results of the model 
 
Proposition 1: 
An increase in the growth rate of (unskilled9) wages ex-post land reform 2 1θ θ>   yields land 
reform unviable in terms of economic efficiency. Thus, in this context and under the referred 
hypotheses there will be an aggregate welfare loss which yields in dynamic terms land reform 
inefficient; i.e. the loss generated by the eviction of agronomists and by theirs human capital loss 
will never be recovered with wage increase.10 
Demonstration: see Rocha de Sousa (2008: 224-5). 
 
Proposition 2 
If there is a decrease on wage growth rate after land reform, then it is possible to define a new 
possibility set of land reform accordingly to the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of Traditional Land 
Reform. 
Demonstration: See Rocha de Sousa (2008: 225-6). 
 
                                                 
9 We refer to unskilled or undifferentiated wages, thus to non-specific functions and for those which do 
not demand human capital – thus for factor L and not H. This proposition becomes interesting 
because empirically tends to be checked as after land reform there tends to have an increase in these 
types of wages due to the greater lobbying union power – specially on those LR of the more 
interventionist type. 
10Notice we are considering T** fixed. This result might change with T** variable, but within Arrow’s 
model capital (in our case human capital) tends to have a finite life, and thus the plausibility of this 
hypothesis. 
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Proposition 3 
If the inter-temporal discount rate increases ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of 
Traditional Land Reform becomes unattainable, thus land reform is inefficient.  
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008:226). 
 
Proposition 4 
If the inter-temporal discount rate decreases ceteris paribus the Dynamic Recovery Threshold of 
Traditional Land Reform becomes more easily attainable. 
Demonstration: Rocha de Sousa (2008: 227). 
 
Hypothesis 4 – New working hypothesis – partial human capital destruction 
If the eviction of agronomists by campesinos, instead of being totally un-experienced 
and illiterate, they inherit some experience, thus human capital loss is only partial. 
If we can measure it by a factor of literacy11 which we name η , then part of them are 
not totally un-experienced  in terms of farm management and agricultural techniques. 
These campesinos might possess some knowledge of phyto-sanitary and modern 
agronomy techniques. Nevertheless, even if we assume a decrease on the knowledge 
gap, we still assume certain uniformity on the literacy and numeracy differentials 
between agronomists and campesinos. 
 
Question 2: What happens to Land Reform in this setting? 
Human capital recovery will be faster. 
Demonstration: 
Intuitively the human capital loss will be lower in the land reform moment, i.e. there is 
a kind of heritage from agronomists to campesinos – thus the Dynamic Recovery 
Threshold of Land Reform can be more easily attained than in the initial case. 
Formally we must compare: 
( )1TB AGNS Sη≥ −  
Thus, the term . AGNSη  is the bequest or heritage from agronomist to campesinos, and 
so the human capital recovery must occur only till: ( )1 AGNSη− . Formally: 
                                                 
11 Illiteracy rate (%) will be obviously 0 ≤ (Illiteracy = 1 – η) ≤ 1. 
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[ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )** . . . .
0
. ( ) . 1 . . 1 . . ( ) . 1 . . 1 .
RA
RA
TT
t t t t
TB RA AGN
T
S e H t T W e dt e H t W e dt Sρ θ ρ θγ η γ η− −= − − ≥ − − = −∫ ∫
Thus, proceeding as in the initial case, we must take into account . AGNSη , and solving 
it for the gain function (Z(t)): 
 ( ) [ ]**( ) ( ) 1 . ( ) (0)RA RA RA RAZ T T Z T T Z T Zη− − − ≥ − −  
Which will lead equivalently, given ( ) (0)RA RAZ T T Z− =  might be eliminated as a 
common term, and if Z(t) is monotonously increasing and injective: 
( )**( ) ( ) 1 . ( )RA RAZ T Z T Z Tη− ≥ −  
( )**( ) 2 . ( )RAZ T Z Tη≥ −  
From here we withdraw the dynamic profitability condition in which DRTTL (T**) 
comes define by the implicit function. Given the injectivity of the gain function, the 
gains on the threshold T** must exceed the double minus the literacy rate of the 
accumulated profits till the moment of land reform. 
Notice that if the literacy rate is null, then we will be in the case of figure 3, if the 
literacy rate is 100%, then we will be in the case that the DRTTL will be the bissectrix. 
For an intermediate case (namely for the case of developing countries), if the literacy 
rate is 50%, then the frontier will be defined as: **( ) 1,5. ( )RAZ T Z T≥ .  
Figure 5 – PSLR Expansion with Literacy increase (η) 
  
 
 
Bissectrix 
PSLR0 
2 1Z(T ) (2- ).Z(T )η≥
2 1Z(T ) Z(T )≥
2 1Z(T ) 2.Z(T )≥
Z(TRA) 
Z(T**) 
η ↑
0 ( 0)FLR η =
( )1 12FLR η =
2 ( 1)FLR η =
Z(T1) 
Z0(T2) 
Z1(T2) 
Z2(T2) 
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Proposition 5: An increase in the literacy rate leads to a campesinos’ DRTTL improvement and to 
an expansion of the PSLR.  
As a conclusion of the previous section, the increase on the literacy rate leads to an improvement 
on the dynamic recovery threshold of land reform, i.e. the partial recovery of human capital leads 
to a more easily viable land reform for campesinos (and landless), which results itself on an 
expansion of the possibility set of land reforms. 
Demonstration: see figure 5 and Rocha de Sousa (2008:228-9) 
 
The learning effects induced in this Arrow (1962) context due to an increase in 
literacy, can be checked empirically as we shall see on the next section. This further 
emphasizes the role of human capital, its transmission (bequest or heritage) and its’ 
further enabling viability of land reform. 
 
5. Economic efficiency estimates for the “Cédula da Terra” 
The land bill program is a market led land reform program in Brazil funded by the 
Ministério de Desenvolvimento Agrário and the World Bank of which we estimated 
the efficiency of land use. To attain the results presented in table 3 we used stochastic 
frontier estimation analysis (SFA) (Battese and Coelli, 1995).The details are 
contained in Rocha de Sousa et al. (2004) and Silveira et al. (2008). 
The main conclusion we might extract from this table is that the main input of 
production is labour. In this case we show a Cobb-Douglas production function, we 
also tried a general Translog and across states Translog functions, but the quality, 
even though the complexity increases, of the results does not change.  
We used a two step procedure to estimate the efficiency values (that is the differential 
from what is actually produced from what it could have been) of the program. 
Our sample was 309 explorations/farms under the land bill project, for respectively 
the following states of Brazil: MG-Minas Gerais; MA-Maranhão; CE-Ceará; BA-Bahia; 
and an omitted state in the regression PE-Pernambuco. Across states differences 
weren’t significant except for CE (Ceará). 
Other variables which explain technical inefficiency were respectively: SCH, schooling, 
a measure of (general) human capital; technical assistance, TA, a measure of specific 
human capital; CRE, credit, this is credit which was granted within the projects’ 
framework (and was computed as a dummy variable); VSP, value of social 
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production, this is production for all the village society; and finally AUTO, or more 
exactly self-consumption, this is the production farmers used for their own 
consumption. 
Table 3: Results of the prodution frontier estimation for the Cédula da Terra 
Parameter Coeficient Standard Error t-ratio 
Production Function 
Const 0.81498234E+01 0.18336618E+00  0.44445620E+02³ 
Log Land -0.94764106E-09 0.15489413E-09 -0.61179921E+01³ 
Log Labour 0.32970832E+00 0.61786554E-01  0.53362471E+01³ 
Log Inputs 0.35411607E-09 0.16372147E-09  0.21629177E+01² 
Inefficiency Explanatory variables 
Const 0.97548995E+00 0.81808204E+00  0.11924109E+01 
MG -0.10435214E-07 0.81683476E-08 -0.12775184E+01 
MA -0.88520603E-09 0.76959237E-09 -0.11502271E+01 
CE 0.10847668E-07 0.53239732E-08  0.20375137E+01² 
BA 0.73663693E-09 0.71537487E-09  0.10297216E+01 
SCH -0.15632321E+01 0.80377935E+00 -0.19448523E+01¹ 
TA -0.50202264E+01 0.24055359E+01 -0.20869472E+01² 
CRE -0.44089913E+01 0.19443393E+01 -0.22676039E+01² 
VSP -0.11723769E+01 0.56630320E+00 -0.20702283E+01² 
AUTO -0.18471073E+00 0.11115760E+00 -0.16617014E+01¹ 
2σ    0.27500643E+01 0.11017865E+01  0.24960047E+01² 
γ  0.87437607E+00 0.53754672E-01  0.16266048E+02³ 
   
Log Likelihood Funtion 0.39807131E+03  
LR Test (dist χ2(12;1%)=26,12) 0.91367528E+02³  
Total observations 309  
   
¹ significant at 10%   
² significant at 5%   
³ significant at 1%   
Source: Rocha de Sousa et. al (2004); Silveira et al. (2008) 
 
The main conclusions we might withdraw from table 3, and consequently from the 
analysis of efficiency in production of the land bill project are the following:  
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The analysis of technical efficiency addresses some important issues that allow us to 
understand production limits.  
Firstly, the two main factors which reduce technical inefficiency are monthly TA and 
CRE. One must stress the failure of technical assistance in most states, but 
nevertheless the monthly agronomists’ visitations did take some effect on reducing 
inefficiency in production. This is a known fact in the literature which our study 
confirms and that political farmers’ vindications have come to stress even more. It 
shows that farmers face up dire external constraints for the use of their resources, and 
that land access, is not by itself, a guarantee for higher productions or for the efficient 
use of resources. Secondly, our analysis confirmed the importance of education, even 
though starting from very low levels of education, which characterize Cédula’s 
beneficiaries, education interacts with technical assistance, because it eases up the 
learning of new concepts and processes, and besides also contributes to improving 
the access to credit – a well educated farmer is more prone to have credit access than 
an illiterate one. Thus, this is also true for the general access to all markets that more 
education allows. 
 
Figure 6: Beneficiary frequency (number of beneficiaries) accordingly to their 
technical efficiency (0 to 1) 
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Source: Rocha de Sousa et al. (2004) 
Figure 6 shows all the efficiency classes from the 309 farms sample of Cédula’s land 
bill. On the horizontal axis we have the efficiency classes form 0% to 100%, and on the 
vertical axis the number of farms on each class. A quick glimpse shows that there is a 
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widespread technical inefficiency, around 150 farms distribute themselves between 
0% to 60% efficiency, and the other half of the sample has between 60% to 80% 
efficiency, and an upper class of efficiency between 80%-90% of 20 farms. 
The main policy conclusion is that we must reinforce credit and technical assistance 
as first line priorities in reducing technical inefficiency. In second place one should 
stress with a long run target expected result the pro-education policies. These 
variables condition the ability to obtain better prices, better markets, to adopt 
products and practices which increase not only productivity, but also the value 
attained by production. 
Thus, we have clearly shown that our variables, which we have modeled theoretically, 
for instance general human capital (education, as literacy and numeracy) and specific 
human capital (technical assistance) play a key role in sustaining development. 
The variable credit, which we have not modeled here, but can be also shown 
theoretically (as in Rocha de Sousa, 2008, ch.9), has also a key role in the reduction 
of technical inefficiency of land reform programs and works as an escape clause from 
poverty equilibria. 
 
6. Conclusions 
“Rocha de Sousa (2005) examines whether instituting land reform (an issue 
especially relevant in Latin America) will accelerate or decelerate growth. Land 
reform splits large properties run by well educated owners into smaller properties 
run by uneducated farmers. Hence, a trade-off. Splitting up large properties 
increases competition and efficiency while at the same time entails the loss of 
human capital. The relative size of the two effects will determine the effect of land 
reform on growth.” in Roufagalas (2006:3). 
 
We might conclude from section 1, as we defined land reform as redistribution 
operated by splitting large estates into smaller ones, that we can define a typology of 
land reforms as in table 1, describing the degree of market intervention (whether it is 
centralized or decentralized (C,D)) versus the degree of political change (whether it is 
reformist or structural (R,S)), that is if we have a continuous and gradual swift 
change or instead a coup or political revolution. Table 1 realized actual processes of 
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land reform, in which we classified MST movement as centralized in the economic 
sphere and reformist in the political one (C,R) as opposed to the market led land bill 
(Cédula da Terra) which we characterized  as decentralized (pro-market) and 
reformist in the political domain, thus Cédula was on the (D,R) cell. We also 
presented another approach due to Kawagoe which further characterized land 
reforms in Latin America, stating that they operate a change from a half-feudal 
economic system to a market or peasant economy. 
On section 2 we characterized peasant or campesinos movements in Latin America, 
with more emphasis on Brazil, besides focusing on Latin America as the most unequal 
distribution of land, as measured by the Land Gini Index (81%) – see Fig.1.  
The main conclusion is that as we might have inferred from section 1 that land was an 
economic asset, also on section 2, we can conclude that land is a political asset – to 
stress this more see Lapp (2004), where she scrutinizes relations between land 
tenancy and political power. The second point of section 2 is that violence against the 
landed elite pays-off for the offender, sooner or later, they will get a title for land, and 
eventually can negotiate it, and re-enter again in the struggle for new lands. Of course 
there is some risk involved, they can get killed or severally injured in the process. 
On section 3 we modeled the impact of land redistribution on growth, through 
human capital destruction. To our main question how many years would it take for 
campesinos to recover the loss of human capital due to the eviction of agronomists, we 
concluded that it would take about the double time it had passed till the date of land 
reform.  
On section 4 we explored the results of the models: under certain hypotheses, 
constancy of interest rate, production function, wage growth rate, we conclude on 
Proposition 1, that if there was an increase of (unskilled) wages due to greater union 
power due to the land reform, then land reform would be totally inefficient- there 
would never be a recovery of these human capital losses by campesinos. Proposition 3 
yields the same result for the increase of the inter-temporal discount or interest rate. 
Besides we extended the model to comply partial destruction of human capital, 
allowing it to have a bequest from the eviction of the agronomist to the new campesino 
(it could be a former employee of the agronomist). This yielded that the recovery of 
(partial) human capital loss would be faster, which is natural due to accumulated 
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learning by doing processes. Thus, literacy and numeracy increase the pace of 
recovery. 
On section 5 we estimated a stochastic Cobb-Douglas production frontier to assess 
the economic efficiency of “Cédula da Terra”. We concluded that there are five major 
variables which reduce technical inefficiency: human capital, in its general form, that 
is education or schooling and its specific form, technical assistance, besides access to 
credit, the value of social production and the value of self-consumption. 
 
Our main conclusion:  land is both a political and economic asset and our main 
policies for land reform should be market led if we want to keep up with economic 
efficiency, as we have shown theoretically and in an applied case for Brazil; 
One should promote credit and technical assistance as a first line priority and in the 
longer run try to foster education, as a last resort to withdraw campesinos from the 
poverty equilibria they are trapped on. 
These kinds of policies will pay off in the long run by including poor people in society 
and promoting simultaneously more efficiency and equity. 
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